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Abstract
This paper analyses the dynamic consequences of interest rate feedback rules
in a flexible-price model where money enters the utility function. Two alter-
native rules are considered based on past or predicted inflation rates. The
main feature is to consider inflation rates that are selected over a bounded
time horizon. We prove that if the Central Bank’s forecast horizon is not too
long, an active and forward-looking monetary policy is not destabilizing: the
equilibrium trajectory is unique and monotonic. This is an advantage with
respect to active and backward-looking policies that are shown to lead to a
unique but fluctuating dynamic.
JEL Classification: E31, E43, E52.
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1 Introduction
SinceMcCallum (1981), monetary feedback rules have been studied to reestab-
lish determinacy in monetary models (Bernanke and Woodford, 1997, Wood-
ford, 2003). The choices pertaining to the modeling of the variables’ timing
are particularly important in those models (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2000,
2001), and recommendations may vary depending on whether a discrete-
or continuous-time representation is chosen (Dupor, 2001, Carlstrom and
Fuerst, 2003, 2005). In this article, we study and extend a framework ini-
tially proposed by Benhabib (2004) that mix both representations.
This is a continuous-time model with flexible prices and money in the
utility function where the current nominal interest rates are set by a Central
Bank according to a feedback rule, as in Benhabib et al. (2001). The main
feature is that interest rate policy is not defined according to the current
value of inflation, nor on its value over an infinite horizon, but on its val-
ues over a finite horizon. With this assumption, the continuous-time model
is more similar to traditional discrete-time models used in the literature.
It turns out to be easier to solve. As recalled by Benhabib (2004), with
discrete-time frameworks, the order of the diﬀerence equation that describes
the equilibrium increases with the number of lagged inflation rates. For in-
stance, the Taylor (1993) rule based on inflation recorded over the last four
quarters implies that dynamics are described by an equation of at least 4th
order, which is diﬃcult to study analytically. In continuous-time, considering
a bounded backward-looking rule leads to a dynamic that is described by a
delay diﬀerential equation. We show how to use recent mathematical results
on functional diﬀerential equations (d’Albis et al. 2012, 2013) to easily solve
analytically the issue of the determinacy of the equilibrium in the framework
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developed by Benhabib (2004). We also extend his analysis by considering a
forward-looking rule that leads to an advance diﬀerential equation. Accord-
ing to Clarida et al. (1998, 2001), forward looking rules seem to be more
realistic while Orphanides (2001) show that they provide a better fit of real
time data than current or backward-looking rules.
The results of our study, where consumption and money are assumed to
be complementary in the utility function, are as follows. When the interest
rate rule is a function of past inflation rates, equilibrium is indeterminate
if the policy is passive and unique if the policy is active. This result holds
whatever the length of the horizon for which inflation rates are taken into
account in the interest rate rule. Moreover, the dynamics are characterized by
short-term fluctuations, even when the equilibrium is determinate. When the
interest rate rule is a function of future inflation rates, equilibrium remains
indeterminate if the policy is passive; on the other hand, if the policy is active,
equilibrium is unique provided that the Central Bank’s forecast horizon is
not too distant. This implies that fixing a short-term horizon may be an
alternative to an aggressive interest rates policy. This complements earlier
findings from models with sticky prices (Batini and Pearlman, 2002, Batini
et al. 2004, 2006, Levine et al. 2007).
We recognize certain limitations to our study. First of all, we do not
investigate the global dynamics of the system despite the fact that several
studies have demonstrated its importance in interest rate policies (Benhabib
et al. 2003, Eurepi, 2005, Cochrane, 2011). Similarly, we do not study per-
manent oscillations, especially those generated by Hopf bifurcations, despite
the fact they may appear in this approach. In both instances, we are limited
by the fact that there are no general theorems for the type of equations being
considered.
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In Section 2, we present the model whose solution is studied in Sections 3
and 4, where we make the distinction between backward-looking and forward-
looking policies. Our conclusions are discussed in Section 5.
2 Feedback rules over a bounded horizon
We consider a model that is similar to those studied by Benhabib et al. (2001)
and Benhabib (2004). This is a flexible-price model where nominal interest
rates are set by the Central Bank as a function of past or forecasted inflation
rates. The novelty is to consider that backward and forward horizons of the
Central Bank are bounded.
Time is continuous and is denoted by  ∈ R+. Let  ()   () and  () be
respectively real consumption, real balances held for non-production purposes
and real financial wealth. The household’s problem is:
max
{}
Z ∞
0
− ( ()  ()) 

¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
0 () = [ ()−  ()]  ()− () () +  −  ()−  () 
 (0)  0 given,
lim→+∞  () −
 
0 [()−()] ≥ 0
(1)
where   0 and   0 denote the rate of time preference and the output,
respectively.  ()   () and  () are perfectly anticipated by the household
and denote the trajectories of the nominal interest rate, the inflation rate
and the real lump-sum taxes. The instant utility function  ( ()  ()) is
strictly increasing (  0,   0) and strictly concave (  0,   0)
in both arguments. Moreover, consumption and real balances are assumed
to be complementary (  0), which implies that they are both normal
goods. The cases where real balances are substitutable with consumption
3
or are productive are immediate extensions of the present work. We assume
that the fiscal policy is Ricardian.
Letting  () be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household’s
instant budget constraint, the first order conditions are:
 () =  ( ()  ())  (2)
 () =  ( ()  ()) ( ()  ())  (3)
0 () =  () [ +  ()− ()]  (4)
together with the household’s instant budget constraint given in problem (1)
and the transversality condition:
lim→+∞  () −
 
0 [()−()] = 0 (5)
We assume that nominal interest rates are set by the Central Bank according
to the following rule:
 () =  ¡¡1−  − ¢ () +  () +  ()¢  (6)
where  () and  () denote backward and forward indicators of inflation
defined respectively by the weighted averages of past and expected future
rates of inflation. The indicators write:
() =
R 
−Ω (−) () R 0
−Ω 
and () =
R +Ω
 − (−) () R Ω
0
−  (7)
where Ω  0 and Ω  0 respectively denote the bounded backward and
forward horizon of the Central Bank, where   0 and   0 are the
weights associated to inflation rates within the indicators, and where  ≥ 0
and  ≥ 0, which satisfy  +   1, are the weights given by the Central
Bank to the backward and forward indicators. Below, we consider either a
backward-looking feedback rule, for  = 0, or a forward-looking one, for
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 = 0. Finally, we assume that 0 ()  0 for all  ∈ R+. As in Leeper
(1991), the policy is considered to be active for 0  1 and passive for 0  1.
The interest rate rule we consider is more general than the one of Benhabib
et al. (2001) who study the limit cases Ω → +∞ and Ω → +∞. It is,
moreover, similar to Benhabib (2004) who assumes  = 0  = 1 and
considers the following indicator:
() =
R −Ω
−∞ (−) () R −Ω
−∞ 
 (8)
Benhabib (2004) hence assumes that information about past inflation rates
is obtained by the Central Bank after a delay while we assume that, after
some time, information conveyed by past inflation rate is not considered as
relevant by the Central Bank. Formally, the advantage of (8) is that the
functional equation may reduce to a diﬀerence equation, which makes the
comparison with discrete time models easier.
In equilibrium, the goods market must clear, which writes:  () = 
By replacing this equilibrium condition in (2) and (3), we obtain:  () =
 ( ())  and () = (())(())  Let us use the latter to define the implicit
function () = ( ()) and replace it in the former. We diﬀerentiate with
respect to time the new equation and rearrange using (4) to obtain:
0 () = Λ ( ()) [ ()−  −  ()]  (9)
with
Λ ( ()) ≡  ( ( ())) ( ( ())) −
 ( ( ()))
 ( ( ()))  (10)
The dynamics of the variables  ()   (),  (),  () for all  ∈ R+ are
characterized by a system composed of two algebraic equations given in (7),
a static equation (6), and a diﬀerential equation (9). We remark that the
algebraic equations reduce to diﬀerential equations with a discrete delay or a
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discrete advance when diﬀerentiated once with respect to time.  () and  ()
are forward variables, with  (0+) and  (0+) that are not given. Initial con-
ditions for these two variables hence write: () = ¯ () ∈  ¡[−Ω 0)R+¢
given and () = ¯() ∈  ¡[−Ω 0)R+¢ given. In principle, we also have
that () = ¯() ∈  ¡[−Ω 0)R+¢   (0−) given. However, using the
first equation of (7) computed for  = 0, we see that  () is a backward
variable whose initial condition is now: () = ¯() given for  ∈ £−Ω 0¤
and where (0+) is given by the algebraic equation. This implies that ¯()
may be discontinuous at  = 0. Conversely, using (6) computed at  = 0,
we see that  () is a forward variable with the following initial condition:
() = ¯() ∈  ¡[−Ω 0)R+¢ given.  (0+) will have to be determined
and will be possibly diﬀerent from  (0−).
For the perfect-foresight equilibrium we consider, it is implicitly assumed
that the initial price level is given. More precisely, for all  ∈ [−Ω 0), the
price level, denoted  ()  solves:
 () =  ¡−Ω¢  0−Ω () (11)
Hence, this is  (0+) (which is allowed to be diﬀerent from  (0−)) that
is arbitrarily chosen in our framework. It is well known since Sargent and
Wallace (1975) that the initial price level cannot be determined in this type
of model.
As in Benhabib et al. (2001), we are going to study the trajectories for
which the inflation rate converges to a constant. We provide a local analysis
of these trajectories and, therefore, restrict ourselves to neighborhoods of a
steady-state defined as a collection (∗ ∗ ∗ ∗) that solves ∗ = ∗ =
∗ = ∗ −  and
 (∗)− ∗ −  = 0 (12)
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We assume1 there exists a steady-state that satisfies: 0 (∗) 6= ¡1−  − ¢−1.
It is also important (Benhabib et al. 2002 and Cochrane, 2011) to assume
the uniqueness of the steady-state.
Since we consider functional equations, the Hartman-Grobman theorem
does not apply to our problem, and we have to prove that studying the
linearized system is not misleading. This is done by establishing the following
result.
Lemma 1. In the neighborhood of the steady-state, the dynamics of the
system of equations (6), (7) and (9) behave similarly to those of its linearized
counterpart, provided that the latter is hyperbolic.
Proof. See Appendix.
The condition in Lemma 1 will be satisfied below. We now compare
the dynamics induced by the choice of the Central Bank to follow either a
backward-looking interest rate rule or a forward-looking one.
3 Backward-looking feedback rules
We consider the case where nominal interest rates are set by the Central
Bank as a function of past and present inflation rates. For  = 0, the
1Equivalently, we could have given straightforward conditions on the limits of function
 that would be suﬃcient for existence of a real solution to (12). Note also that since
0  0, existence implies uniqueness.
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perfect-foresight equilibrium satisfies:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 () = Λ ( ())
∙
 ()−  − −1(())−()
(1−)
¸

() =
 
−Ω 
(−)[−1(())−()]
(1−)  0−Ω 

() = ¯() given for  ∈ £−Ω 0¤ 
lim→+∞ () = ∗, lim→+∞ () = ∗.
(13)
The system (13) is defined as a two dimensional system composed by an
ordinary diﬀerential equation and an algebraic equation with a continuum
of delays, which reduces to a delay diﬀerential equation when diﬀerentiated
once with respect to time. There is one forward variable, (), and one
backward variable,  (), for which a discontinuity is allowed at  = 0, as
(0+) is given by the algebraic equation.
We are going to study the local existence and uniqueness of solutions a
such a system by applying Theorem 1 in d’Albis et al. (2013). Let us denote
by + the number of roots with positive real parts of the characteristic equa-
tion associated with the linearized counterpart of system (13). We remark
that if +  0, then 0   ≤ +, where  is the dimension of the unstable
eigenspace.
Lemma 2. The characteristic equation associated with the linearized coun-
terpart of system (13) has + = 0 if 0 (∗) ∈ (0 1), and + = 1 if
0 (∗)  1
Proof. See Appendix.
By applying Theorem 1 in d’Albis et al. (2013), we conclude that the
equilibrium is locally indeterminate if the monetary policy is passive while
it is locally unique if the policy is active. In other words, if the policy is
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passive the steady-state is stable in the sense that there is a continuum of
 (0+) that initiate a converging trajectory. If the policy is active, there is a
unique solution for  (0+) and the steady-state is saddle-point stable. This
confirms and extends the results obtained by Benhabib (2004) for the case
where recent and contemporaneous inflation rates are not included in the
rule. Benhabib found that following a passive policy is a suﬃcient condition
for local indeterminacy whereas an active policy is a necessary condition for
uniqueness. With Lemma 2, we show that an active policy is also a suﬃcient
condition for local uniqueness.
To see the importance of the bounded backward horizon on this result,
we now consider the case where Ω → +∞, which is also studied in Benhabib
(2004) who considers the limit case of no informational delay. The system
(13) reduces to a system of two ordinary diﬀerential equations. The next
Lemma studies the roots of the corresponding characteristic function.
Lemma 3. Assume that Ω → +∞. The characteristic equation has + = 0
if 0 (∗) ∈ (0 1), and + = 1 if 0 (∗)  1
Proof. See Appendix.
We see that the determinacy property is the same as in Lemma 2: there
are multiple equilibria if the policy is passive but the equilibrium is unique
if the policy is active. The finite delay has, thus, no impact on the de-
terminacy of the equilibrium. This result generalizes what Benhabib et al.
(2001) showed about the determinacy condition being the same for current-
looking rules and backward-looking rules with an infinite horizon. However,
the dynamics are qualitatively quite diﬀerent. In the case where the policy
is active, the dynamics converge with exponentially decreasing fluctuations
toward the steady-state if Ω is finite whereas they are monotonic if Ω is
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infinite. This diﬀerence is due to the complex roots that generically emerge
when using delay diﬀerential equations (see e.g. Boucekkine et al. 2004). As
fluctuations in  () leads to fluctuations in the instantaneous utility of the
representative household, a welfare analysis would lead us to recommend an
infinite horizon rule rather than a finite one.
There is an assumption that is important in our setting. We assume that
contemporaneous inflation is necessarily included in the interest rate rule,
which formally comes from assumption:   1. Conversely, if it is assumed
that  = 1, the rule (6) becomes  () =  ¡ ()¢ and the problem is signif-
icantly modified as the nominal interest rate becomes a backward variable.
Moreover, using (7) and (9), the dynamics reduce to a single equation that
writes:
 () = 
⎛
⎝
R 
−Ω (−)
h
 ()− 0()Λ(())
i
R 0
−Ω 
− 
⎞
⎠  (14)
This is a delay diﬀerential equation of neutral type and theorems in d’Albis
et al. (2013) do not cover this kind of equation2.
4 Forward-looking feedback rules
We now consider the case where nominal interest rates are set by the Central
Bank as a function of expected and present inflation rates. For  = 0, the
perfect-foresight equilibrium satisfies:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 () = Λ ( ())
∙
 ()−  − −1(())− ()
(1−)
¸

() =
 +Ω
 −
 (−)[−1(())− ()]
(1−)  Ω0 −

lim→+∞ () = ∗, lim→+∞ () = ∗.
(15)
2A possibility would be to use optimal control as in Boucekkine, Fabbri and Pintus
(2012).
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System (15) is similar to system (13) except that the algebraic equation
includes advances rather than delays. Moreover, the two variables,  () and
(), are forward. To study the local existence and uniqueness of solutions
of (15), Theorem 2 in d’Albis et al. (2013) can easily be applied to its
linearized counterpart. Using Corollary 2, we conclude that there exists at
least one solution to system (15). The next Lemma studies local uniqueness
of the equilibrium. We denote by − the number of roots of the characteristic
equation that have negative real parts.
Lemma 4. Let ¯ ≡ Λ (∗) and assume that   ¯ . The characteristic
equation associated with the linearized counterpart of system (15) has − = 1
if 0 (∗) ∈ (0 1), and − = 0 if 0 (∗)  1
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 4 states that if the weight associated to future inflation rates is
suﬃciently low the determinacy typology of the equilibrium is the same as
the one obtained with backward-looking feedback rules. If  is above a
finite threshold, there exists a unique equilibrium if the policy is active (the
steady-state is unstable and both  () and  () jump to their long-run
values) while the equilibrium is locally indeterminate if the policy is passive.
This result can be interpreted by a continuity argument by noticing that in
the limit case where  → 0, one gets a current-looking rule. Contrarily
to backward-looking feedback rules, there are no exponentially decreasing
fluctuations in the dynamics. Moreover, as  () = ∗ and  () = ∗ for all
, the welfare of the representative household does not depend on parameters¡  Ω¯¢.
The threshold ¯ constitutes a standard limit to the size of feedback on
forward feedback. For low discount factors (i.e. for   ¯), the characteri-
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zation of the roots is tedious but other situations may arise. For instance, it
can be shown that there exist sets of parameters such that the equilibrium
is indeterminate whatever the value of 0 (∗) and others that exhibit pure
imaginary roots. This confirms previous results on the destabilizing eﬀects of
forward-looking feedback rules (Woodford, 1999, and Benhabib et al. 2001
or Bernanke and Woodford, 1997, in a discrete time model).
Nevertheless, in our setting, a natural way to reduce the weight associated
to future inflation rates can be obtained by modifying the upper bound of
the integral, Ω . This is studied in the next Lemma.
Lemma 5. There exists Ω¯  0 such that for Ω  Ω¯ , the characteristic
equation associated with the linearized counterpart of system (15) has − ≥ 1
if 0 (∗) ∈ (0 1), and − = 0 if 0 (∗)  1
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 5 implies that local indeterminacy of active monetary policies
with a forward-looking feedback rule are ruled out by choosing a not too
long forecasting horizon. This result can also be interpreted by continuity.
Indeed, for Ω = 0, one gets a current-looking rule. Conversely, the case of an
infinite horizon (which was analyzed by Benhabib et al. 2001) our suﬃcient
condition is not satisfied and one may find multiple equilibria. This case is
studied in the next Lemma.
Lemma 6. Let ˆ ≡ ¯
h
1
0∗(∗) −
¡
1− ¢i and assume that Ω → +∞.
For 0 (∗) ∈ (0 1), the characteristic equation has − = 1. For 0 (∗)  1,
the characteristic equation has − = 2 if   ˆ , and − = 0 if   ˆ .
Proof. See Appendix.
To eliminate local indeterminacy, Lemma 6 suggests that the Central
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Bank should follow a very active (i.e. choose a large 0∗ (∗)) monetary pol-
icy or a large  if Ω is infinite. With Lemmas 5 and 6, we conclude that
reducing the forecasting horizon can be an alternative to an aggressive mon-
etary policy. This limit for the degree of forward-lookingness is similar to
some results that we have seen in discrete-time models with sticky prices by
Batini and Nelson (2001), Batini and Pearlman (2002), Batini et al. (2004)
and Batini et al. (2006). The main message we can take from this is that
feedback should be at a horizon less than where equilibrium is reached.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we used recent stability theorems for functional diﬀerential
equations in order to analyze the local dynamics of a flexible price and money-
in-the-utility-function model with backward- or forward-looking interest rate
rules. We showed that the horizon over which the inflation rates are selected
may play an important role in the determinacy of the equilibrium. With
backward-looking feedback rules, an active policy leads to short-run fluctua-
tions of nominal interest rates if the horizon is bounded. Those fluctuations
vanish if the horizon is infinite. With forward-looking feedback-rules, an ac-
tive policy leads to determinacy provided that the forecasting horizon is not
too long.
As an extension of this work, it could be interesting to turn to normative
considerations and define the optimal rule that allows the Central Bank to
achieve its objectives.
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6 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The system composed by equations (6), (7) and (9) rewrites
as follows:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 () = Λ ( ())
h
 ()−  − −1(())−()− ()
1−−
i

() =
 
−Ω 
(−)[−1(())−()− ()]
(1−−)  0−Ω 

() =
 +Ω
 −
 (−)[−1(())−()− ()]
(1−−)  Ω0 −

(16)
A Taylor approximation on the neighborhood of the steady-state transforms
the previous system into:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 () = Λ∗
∙µ
1− 10∗(1−−)
¶
 () + ()+ ()
1−−
¸
+M ¡() () ()¢ 
() =
 
−Ω 
(−)()
0∗ −
()− ()


(1−−)  0−Ω 
+
 
−Ω 
(−)N (())
(1−−)  0−Ω 

() =
 +Ω
 −
 (−)()
0∗ −
()− ()


(1−−)  Ω0 −
+
 +Ω
 −
 (−)N (())
(1−−)  Ω0 −

(17)
where Λ∗ ≡ Λ (∗), and 0∗ ≡ 0 (∗), and where the nonlinearities write:
M ¡  ¢ = [Λ (+∗)− Λ (∗)] ∙− 0∗−−1−− ¸
−Λ(+∗)N ()
1−− 
N () = −1(∗ +)− −1(∗)− 0∗ 
D’Albis et al. (2012) provide a linearization theorem for hyperbolic systems of
diﬀerential-algebraic equations. Some conditions are standard and obviously
satisfied for system (16). More importantly, both the linear and the non
linear parts of the algebraic equations should reduce to functional diﬀerential
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equations when diﬀerentiated a finite number of times, which can easily be
checked here by diﬀerentiating once with respect to time. Third, the non
linear part and its first derivatives with respect to
¡  ¢ should vanish
for
¡  ¢ = (0 0 0), which is also satisfied. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. The linearized counterpart of system (13) is obtained by
substituting  = 0 in the linear parts of the first two equations of system
(17). We obtain:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0() = Λ∗
∙µ
1− 10∗(1−)
¶
 () + 
1− ()
¸

() =  R −Ω (−) h()0∗ −  ()i 
where we recall that Λ∗ ≡ Λ (∗), and 0∗ ≡ 0 (∗) and where we introduce
 ≡ 1
h¡
1− ¢ R 0−Ω i  The characteristic function of this system,
denoted  (), is defined such that  () = det (I ()) where:
I () =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
 − Λ∗
µ
1− 10∗(1−)
¶
−Λ∗ 1−
−0∗
R 0
−Ω (
+) 1 +  R 0−Ω (+)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
Thus:
 () = ( − Λ∗)
µ

Z 0
−Ω
(+) + 1
¶
+
Λ∗
0∗(1− )  (18)
To prove the lemma, we proceed in two steps. 1/ we show there exists a
unique positive real root if 0∗  1 and that there is no positive real root if
0∗ ∈ (0 1). 2/ we show there is no complex root with positive real parts.
1/ Real roots of  () = 0 Observe first that if  − Λ∗ ≥ 0 one has
 ()  0 and that if  − Λ∗  0 one has 0 ()  0. Moreover, for  ∈
(0Λ∗), one has  (0)   ()   (Λ∗) with  (0) = Λ∗ (1− 0∗) 0∗(1 − )
and  (Λ∗) = Λ∗0∗(1 − ) Hence, if 1 − 0∗  0, there exists a real root
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 ∈ (0Λ∗) such that  () = 0 and if 1 − 0∗  0, there is no real root
 ∈ (0Λ∗) such that  () = 0
2/ Complex roots of  () = 0 Let us denote the complex roots by  =
+ . We first prove that there are no complex roots with positive real part
that satisfy   Λ∗ by showing that | ()|  0 For   Λ∗ one has:
| ()| 
¯¯¯¯ Λ∗
0∗(1− ) − |(Λ∗ − )|
¯¯¯¯µ

Z 0
−Ω
(+) + 1
¶¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯

Then, it is suﬃcient to observe that the right-hand-side of the above inequal-
ity is greater than  ()  0 to conclude. Let us now consider the roots
whose real parts belong to (0Λ∗). We are going to show that in this case:
Im ( ())    0 One has:
Im ( ()) = 
∙

Z 0
−Ω
(+) cos() + 1
¸
−(− Λ∗)
Z −Ω
0
(+) sin()
Thus:
Im ( ())  
∙

Z 0
−Ω
(+) [ cos() +  sin()]  + 1
¸

Since:
 cos() +  sin() =
∙¡2 + 2¢ Z 0

 sin () − 
¸
−
one has:
Im ( ())  
∙

Z 0
−Ω

∙¡2 + 2¢ Z 0

 sin () − 
¸
 + 1
¸

Using the fact that
R 
0
(+) sin()  0 for   0 suﬃces to complete
the proof. ¤
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Proof of Lemma 3. When Ω → +∞ the characteristic function (18) be-
comes
 () = 2 + 
∙ 
(1− ) + Λ∗
µ
1− 0∗(1− )
0∗(1− )
¶¸
+
Λ∗
(1− )
µ
1− 0∗
0∗
¶

for all   −. One has:
 ¡−¢ = − 
(1− )
¡ + Λ∗¢  0
 (0) = Λ∗

(1− )
µ
1− 0∗
0∗
¶
Hence, there is one real root that belongs to
¡− 0¢ if 0∗  1 and that is
positive if 0∗  1. The other real root is lower than −, but the projection
on the eigenvector related to this latter root is zero according to the definition
of  (0+). ¤
Proof of Lemma 4. The linearized counterpart of system (13) is obtained by
substituting  = 0 in the linear parts of the first and the third equations of
system (17). We obtain:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 () = Λ∗
∙µ
1− 10∗(1−)
¶
 () + 
1−  ()
¸
() =  R +Ω − (−) h()0∗ −  ()i 
where we recall that Λ∗ ≡ Λ (∗), and 0∗ ≡ 0 (∗) and where we introduce
 ≡ 1
h¡
1− ¢ R Ω
0
−
i
. The characteristic function of this system,
denoted  (), is defined such that  () = det (I ()) where:
I () =
⎛
⎜⎝
 − Λ∗
µ
1− 10∗(1−)
¶
−Λ∗ 1−
−0∗
R Ω
0
(− ) 1 +  R Ω
0
(− )
⎞
⎟⎠ 
which gives:
 () = ( − Λ∗)
Ã

Z Ω
0
(− ) + 1
!
+
Λ∗
0∗ (1− )  (19)
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Let us define ¯ ≡ Λ∗. We restrict to the case  ≥ ¯ and proceed in two
steps by showing: 1/ there exists one negative real root if 0∗ ∈ (0 1) and no
negative real root if 0∗  1; 2/ there are no complex roots with negative real
parts.
1/ Real roots of  () = 0. Let us compute the derivative of (19):
0 () = 1 + Ω(− )Ω + ¡ − Λ∗¢ Z Ω
0
(− ) (20)
For  ≥ ¯ , one has 0 ()  0 Since lim→−∞  () = −∞ and  (0) =
Λ∗(1−0∗)
0∗(1−)  we conclude that there exists a unique negative real root if 
0∗ ∈
(0 1) and no negative real root if 0∗  1.
2/ Complex roots of  () = 0 Let us denote the complex roots by  = +.
One has:
| ()| 
¯¯¯¯µ
1− 
µ
1 +
 − Λ∗
 − 
¶³
1− (− )Ω
´¶
+
Λ∗
0∗(1− )
¯¯¯¯

We conclude that for  ≥ ¯ , one has: | ()|  | ()|  0 ¤
Proof of Lemma 5. We show that for Ω small enough there exists one nega-
tive real root if 0∗ ∈ (0 1) and no root with negative real part if 0∗  1. We
proceed in three steps:
1/ There is a unique real root to  () = 0 that is negative if 0∗ ∈ (0 1)
and positive if 0∗  1. For Ω small, 0 ()  0 (where 0 () is given by
(20)). We conclude with lim→−∞  () = −∞ lim→+∞  () = +∞ and
 (0) = Λ∗(1−0∗)0∗(1−) .
2/ For 0∗  1, the positive real root, denoted 1, is smaller than Λ∗. For
Ω = 0 the characteristic function (19) rewrites (by applying l’Hôpital’s
Rule):
 () = 1
1− 
∙
 − Λ∗
µ
1− 10∗
¶¸

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For Ω small, 1 is close to Λ∗
³
1− 10∗
´
and is thus smaller than Λ∗ for 0∗  1.
3/ For 0∗  1, there is no complex root  =  + , with real part smaller
than 1 One has:
Re ( ()) = Re
Ã
( − 1)
Z Ω
0
³
(− ) − (1− )
´

!
+Re
Ã
(1 − Λ∗)
Z Ω
0
(− )
!
+Re (( − 1)) 
Using the fact that 1  Λ∗, we conclude that, for Ω small, Re ( ())  0
for all   1 ¤
Proof of Lemma 6. For Ω → +∞, the characteristic function (19) is defined
for  ∈ ¡−∞ ¢ and writes:
 () = −2 + 
(1− )
∙
 − Λ∗
∙
1
0∗ −
¡
1− ¢¸¸+µ 10∗ − 1
¶ Λ∗
(1− ) 
Since lim→−∞  () = −∞ and  (0) =
³
1−0∗0∗
´ Λ∗
(1−) we conclude there is
one negative real root if 0∗ ∈ (0 1) and either zero or two roots with negative
real parts if 0∗  1. The condition that excludes roots with negative real
parts is 0 (0)  0, or equivalently   Λ∗
h
1
0∗ −
¡
1− ¢i. ¤
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